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“INAPPOSITE” AND “AMORPHOUS”: THE 
D.C. CIRCUIT’S REJECTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Katherine Riley* 
Abstract: Since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, the court system 
has been flooded with habeas corpus petitions from prisoners held at the 
U.S. naval detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. These petitioners 
contest the President’s authority to detain them and often rely on princi-
ples of law governing international war to support their arguments. A re-
cent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision rejected international law as 
an interpretive tool for U.S. courts, raising questions about the role of in-
ternational law in the U.S. legal system. This Comment argues that inter-
national law, while not binding on the courts, provides useful guidance 
for interpretation. 
Introduction 
 Ghaleb Nasser Al-Bihani is a Yemeni citizen who has been held in a 
U.S. naval detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba since 2002. 
From Guantanamo, Al-Bihani filed a petition for habeas corpus, con-
testing the U.S. government’s authority to detain him and requesting 
review of his status. On January 28, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia denied Al-Bihani’s petition.1 He appealed the de-
cision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, but the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling on January 5, 2010.2 Al-
Bihani’s subsequent petition for a rehearing en banc was denied on 
August 31, 2010.3 In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Court of 
Appeals, perhaps attempting to chart a clearer path for Guantanamo 
detention review and offer guidance that the Supreme Court had not 
previously provided, firmly rejected Al-Bihani’s contentions that his de-
tention violated international laws of war and eliminated international 
                                                                                                                      
* Katherine Riley is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
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1 Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani I ), 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 590 
F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
2 Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani II ), 590 F.3d 866, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
3 Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani III ), 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
96 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review Vol. 34: E. Supp. 
law as a potential limitation on executive authority and the authority of 
U.S. courts.4 
 Part I of this Comment provides background on Al-Bihani v. Obama 
and the Court of Appeals opinion. Part II examines Supreme Court 
precedent for habeas review for Guantanamo detainees, as well as the 
effect of the Al-Bihani decision on subsequent habeas petitions and on 
U.S. foreign policy. Part III analyzes whether or not U.S. detention pol-
icy, as it has currently evolved, is compatible with international laws of 
war and whether those laws, contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, 
have any binding effect on the United States and its actions abroad or 
domestically. Finally, the Comment explores the advantages and disad-
vantages of the United States’ current policy. 
I. Background 
 In early 2001, Al-Bihani traveled from Saudi Arabia through Paki-
stan to Afghanistan.5 Throughout his travels, he stayed at guest houses 
that he acknowledged were affiliated with the Taliban.6 Upon arrival in 
Afghanistan in 2001, Al-Bihani worked as a cook for the 55th Arab Bri-
gade, a paramilitary group allied with the Taliban.7 The group, which 
included al Qaeda members, fought against the Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan.8 Although Al-Bihani admitted to carrying a brigade-issued 
weapon, he claimed that he never fired it in combat.9 In October 2001, 
forced to retreat by U.S.-led Coalition forces that invaded Afghanistan in 
response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Brigade surrendered to 
Northern Alliance forces.10 The Northern Alliance forces kept Al-Bihani 
in custody until turning him over to Coalition forces in 2002.11 Al-Bihani 
was then sent to Guantanamo Bay for interrogation and detention.12 
 In 2004, following the Supreme Court ruling that statutory habeas 
jurisdiction extended to Guantanamo Bay,13 Al-Bihani filed his petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(a).14 The district court stayed the petition pending a Supreme 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 871. 






11 Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 869. 
12 Id. 
13 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2004). 
14 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006). Section 2241(a) provides that: 
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Court decision in Boumediene v. Bush.15 In Boumediene, the Court found 
section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (2006 MCA), which 
denied jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detain-
ees, unconstitutional.16 The Court acknowledged that the current pro-
cedures used to review a detainee’s status under the Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005 (DTA) were an inadequate substitute for habeas 
corpus, but did not require that “an adequate substitute . . . duplicate 
[section] 2241 in all respects.”17 Additionally, the Court neglected to 
specify the procedural requirements for constitutional detention re-
view, explicitly stating that the opinion “does not address the content of 
the law that governs . . . [the] detention.”18 
 Following the Boumediene decision, the district court issued a case 
management order that finalized the procedure to be used in conduct-
ing the review of Al-Bihani’s detention, ruling that: 1) the government 
bore the burden of proving the lawfulness of Al-Bihani’s detention by a 
preponderance of the evidence; 2) the government must share with Al-
Bihani any evidence used to develop its case for his return, as well as 
any exculpatory evidence; 3) the court would determine whether any 
evidence offered by the government should be presumed accurate or 
authentic, and Al-Bihani would be permitted to rebut any such pre-
sumption; 4) the government would present its evidence first, followed 
by Al-Bihani, whose evidence the government would be able to subse-
quently rebut; and 5) relevant and material hearsay evidence would be 
admitted, which would allow the opposing party an opportunity to chal-
lenge the credibility and weight accorded to any such evidence.19 After 
a day and a half of hearings, the district court ultimately denied Al-
Bihani’s petition, concluding that the government had the authority to 
detain anyone supporting the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces 
and engaged in hostilities against the United States or Coalition forces, 
and finding that Al-Bihani’s actions met that standard.20 The court 
                                                                                                                      
 Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice 
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective juris-
dictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the 
district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had. 
Id. 
15 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008). 
16 Id. at 736, 792. 
17 Id. at 792. 
18 Id. at 798. 
19 See Al-Bihani v. Bush, 588 F. Supp.2d 19, 20–22 (D.D.C. 2008). 
20 See Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 870. 
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based its ruling on the government’s evidence that Al-Bihani, by his 
own admission, had stayed at al Qaeda-affiliated guest houses and had 
served in the 55th Arab Brigade.21 It did not rely on evidence from ad-
missions that Al-Bihani later retracted.22 
 Alleging substantive and procedural defects, Al-Bihani appealed 
the district court’s denial under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).23 Specifically, Al-
Bihani challenged the detention by advancing four arguments based 
on international laws of war.24 First, he contended that the district 
court’s reliance on “support” for the Taliban or al Qaeda as an inde-
pendent basis for detention violated international law, which required 
that a person have fired a weapon in combat in order to be detained.25 
Second, he argued that the Brigade did not have the opportunity to 
declare its neutrality in the fight against the United States.26 Third, he 
asserted that the international war had ended when the Taliban lost 
control of the Afghan government and that Al-Bihani therefore should 
be released in accordance with the requirements of the Third Geneva 
Convention.27 Finally, Al-Bihani argued that the United States had lost 
its authority to detain him when it failed to give him a prisoner-of-war 
status.28 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, affirmed 
the denial and ruled that: 1) Al-Bihani had been lawfully detained; 2) 
his continued detention was justified because the hostilities in Afghani-
stan had not ended; 3) the preponderance of the evidence standard 
adopted did not violate the Constitution; and 4) the district court had 
not improperly admitted U.S. hearsay evidence.29 The court also ex-
plained that the President’s war powers were in no way limited by in-
ternational laws of war; therefore, international law could not serve as 
an authority for U.S. courts: 
[W]hile the international laws of war are helpful to courts 
when identifying the general set of war powers to which the 
AUMF [Authorization for the Use of Military Force] speaks 
. . . their lack of controlling legal force and firm definition 
                                                                                                                      
21 Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani I ), 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39–40 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 590 
F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
22 See id. at 39. 
23 Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 870. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at 870–71. 
26 See id. at 871. 
27 See id. (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(Third Geneva Convention) art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). 
28 See id. 
29 See Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 872, 874–75, 878, 880–81. 
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render their use both inapposite and inadvisable when courts 
seek to determine the limits of the President’s war powers.30 
II. Discussion 
A. Supreme Court Precedent 
1. Rasul v. Bush: The Statutory Habeas Right 
 The Supreme Court first analyzed executive authority to detain 
designated “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo Bay in 2004.31 On June 
18, 2004, the Court decided both Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.32 
The petitioners in Rasul—two Australian citizens and 12 Kuwaiti citi-
zens—were captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan during combat in 
late 2001 and subsequently turned over to U.S. custody.33 They began 
their detention at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in early 2002 and, 
through relatives and friends, filed petitions with the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia challenging their detention and denying 
any involvement in combat, or terrorist acts, against the United States.34 
In order to determine whether U.S. courts had jurisdiction over chal-
lenges to the detention of aliens incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay, the 
Supreme Court traced the history of the writ of habeas corpus, drawing 
comparisons between the detained prisoners and German citizens who 
were captured and incarcerated abroad during World War II.35 In Ra-
sul, the Court ultimately held that, because the petitioners could be 
reached by service of process, and because the United States has com-
plete jurisdiction and control over the Guantanamo Bay naval base, sec-
tion 2241 authorized detainees to bring habeas petitions.36 
                                                                                                                      
30 Id. at 871. 
31 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 
(2004). 
32 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539. 
33 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470–71, 472 n.4. 
34 See id. at 471–72. 
35 See id. at 473–79. 
36 See id. at 478–80, 484; cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that 
German citizens captured by U.S. forces during hostilities in China and held in military 
custody outside of the United States did not have the right to the writ of habeas corpus 
under the U.S. Constitution). 
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2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: Detention Authority and Adequate Due Process 
 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, petitioner Yaser Esam Hamdi challenged the 
President’s authority to detain him as an “enemy combatant” at Guan-
tanamo Bay.37 Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured in 2001 in Af-
ghanistan by members of the Northern Alliance and turned over to the 
U.S. military.38 He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay in January 
2002.39 In a plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that the Au-
thorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) contained a congres-
sional grant of authority to the President to use “all necessary and ap-
propriate force” against any individual or entity associated with the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which included the detention of 
individuals known to be supporting those responsible for the attacks.40 
In response to Hamdi’s argument that the AUMF did not authorize 
indefinite detention, Justice O’Connor explained that detention was 
authorized for the length of the conflict41 and justified her assertion on 
international laws—including the Geneva Convention—stating, “[i]t is 
a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last 
no longer than active hostilities.”42 Hamdi is a clear example of the 
Court’s adoption of an international legal principle to support the 
AUMF and the authority it confers on the President of the United 
States.43 Additionally, the Court held that, as an American citizen, 
Hamdi was entitled to greater due process than that offered to him.44 
3. Boumediene v. Bush: the Constitutional Habeas Right 
 Boumediene presented the Supreme Court with a new issue: wheth-
er alien detainees had the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, 
and, if so, whether the review process provided under the DTA was 
adequate.45 The ruling would affect section 7 of the 2006 MCA, which 
stripped federal courts of any jurisdiction to review the detention of an 
                                                                                                                      
37 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516. 
38 Id. at 510. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. at 518. 
41 See id. at 521. 
42 Id. at 520. 
43 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. 
44 See id. at 535 (“[W]hile the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions 
in other settings may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant set-
ting, the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are 
not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Govern-
ment’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.”); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792. 
45 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33. 
2011 The Role of International Law in the U.S. Legal System 101 
alien designated as an “enemy combatant.”46 Once again tracing the 
history of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court ruled that: 1) aliens de-
tained at Guantanamo Bay had a constitutional right to the writ of ha-
beas corpus; 2) the MCA is not intended to be a de facto suspension of 
the writ; and 3) the detention-review procedures under the DTA were 
an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus.47 The D.C. Circuit Court’s 
response to Al-Bihani’s petition brought international law to—and sub-
sequently rejected it from—habeas corpus jurisprudence. 
B. Al-Bihani II: The Court of Appeals Decision 
 Al-Bihani, a Yemeni citizen, contested his detention at Guantanamo 
Bay through a habeas petition brought pursuant to section 2241(a) of 
the U.S. Code.48 The district court denied his petition for review, and Al-
Bihani appealed, contesting his detention on four grounds and advanc-
ing both substantive and procedural challenges.49 
 First, Al-Bihani contended that reliance on his “support” of al 
Qaeda as the basis for detention violated international law, as inde-
pendent citizens “must commit a direct hostile act, such as firing a 
weapon in combat,” in order for the detention to be lawful.50 The court 
determined that Al-Bihani’s detention was lawful under section 2(a) of 
the AUMF and the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (2009 MCA).51 
The 2009 MCA authorized the trial of “unprivileged enemy belliger-
ents” —those who “purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners.”52 The court rea-
soned that anyone subject to a military commission trial was also sub-
ject to the resulting detention, and that, because the 55th Arab Brigade 
contained al Qaeda members who fought alongside the Taliban and 
against the United States, all members of the Brigade “purposefully and 
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. at 736–37. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e) (West 2010) provided that: 
 (1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien de-
tained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to 
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such de-
termination. 
Id. 
47 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771, 792. 
48 Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani II ), 590 F.3d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
49 See id. at 870–71. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 872–73. 
52 Id. at 872. 
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materially supported” those hostilities against the United States.53 The 
court found statutory authorization for Al-Bihani’s detention under 
both the 2009 MCA and the AUMF, which placed him squarely within 
the scope of the President’s detention authority.54 
 Al-Bihani next argued that, in accordance with law of war princi-
ples, he should be released because the conflict with the Taliban had 
ended.55 He offered the day Hamid Karzai was elected President as one 
of several dates that indicated an end to hostilities.56 In the absence of a 
congressional declaration of termination of the war, the court deferred 
to the President’s determination of whether the conflict had ended ra-
ther than forming its own opinion based on, for example, the nature of 
the conflict or the number of troops in Afghanistan.57 
 As a last resort, Al-Bihani contended that the government’s failure 
to grant him prisoner-of-war (P.O.W.) status violated international law.58 
The court found Al-Bihani’s argument moot because the statutory basis 
for his detention—the AUMF and 2009 MCA—did not depend on his 
designation as a P.O.W.59 Additionally, the court pointed out that the 
2009 MCA “explicitly precludes detainees from claiming the Geneva 
conventions . . . as a source of rights.”60 
 In his final two arguments, Al-Bihani attacked the procedure af-
forded him during his detention review by contending that the habeas 
process did not meet the requirements of the Suspension Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.61 The court relied on the Boumediene holding that 
“habeas procedures for detainees ‘need not resemble a criminal trial’” 
to rebut Al-Bihani’s assertions.62 The court acknowledged that, in this 
case in particular, the adequacy of habeas procedure turned on Al-
Bihani’s status as an alien, apprehended during hostilities in a foreign 
country, and therefore afforded him less process than a petitioner such 
as Hamdi.63 Because the Supreme Court has not determined the stan-
dard of proof required in a habeas proceeding like Al-Bihani’s, Al-
Bihani proposed a reasonable doubt standard, which he justified based 
                                                                                                                      
53 See id. at 872–74. 
54 Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 872–73. 
55 See id. at 874. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
58 Id. at 875. 
59 See id. 
60 Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 875. 
61 See id. (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 
62 See id. at 876 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783). 
63 See id. at 877–78. 
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on the possibility of an indefinite detention.64 The court countered that 
the standard described in Hamdi mimicked a preponderance of the 
evidence standard and was therefore constitutionally appropriate.65 It 
also noted that, because “it is constitutionally permissible to place [a] 
higher burden on a citizen petitioner in a routine case, it follows a pri-
ori that placing a lower burden on the government defending a war-
time detention . . . is also permissible.”66 
 Finally, Al-Bihani claimed that the governmental reports of his in-
terrogation were hearsay and were therefore “improperly admitted ab-
sent an examination of reliability and necessity.”67 In reviewing the dis-
trict court record, the Court of Appeals determined that the lower 
court properly assessed the reliability of the hearsay evidence and de-
ferred to that assessment, pointing out that, according to the rules of 
process set forth in the case management order, Al-Bihani had the op-
portunity to rebut the evidence and undermine its credibility.68 
 Al-Bihani grounded his statutory arguments in international law.69 
Specifically, he claimed that principles of international law limited any 
executive detention authority granted in the AUMF.70 He used Article 
118 of the Third Geneva Convention71 to support his contention that, 
because the war between the Taliban and the United States had ended 
and he had not been designated as a potential danger, the government 
had no authority to detain him.72 Before responding to the substance of 
any of Al-Bihani’s arguments, the court firmly rejected the idea that “the 
war powers granted by the AUMF and other statutes are limited by the 
international laws of war.”73 Rather than examining those principles and 
their potential compatibility with the AUMF and the 2009 MCA—the 
statutory authorizations for Al-Bihani’s detention—the court unilaterally 
declared that international laws of war had not been incorporated into 
law and were therefore not a source of authority for U.S. courts, and 
that Congress had not intended international laws of war to limit execu-
                                                                                                                      
64 See id. at 878. 
65 See id. 
66 Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 878. 
67 Id. at 879. 
68 See id. at 880. 
69 See id. at 870. 
70 See id. at 871. 
71 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 27, art. 118. Article 118 begins: “[p]risoners of 
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” 
72 See Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 871. 
73 See id. 
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tive war powers granted under the AUMF.74 As the concurrence cor-
rectly pointed out, that statement undermined the reasoning in Hamdi, 
which derived authority for the President to detain “enemy combatants” 
for the duration of the hostilities from the Geneva Convention.75 
 Further, the court asserted that “the international laws of war are 
not a fixed code,” and that “[t]heir dictates and application to actual 
events are by nature contestable and fluid.”76 Disregarding the Su-
preme Court’s reliance on international law in Hamdi, the court firmly 
rejected any attempt to give international law a role in the habeas re-
view process.77  Moreover, the court declared that it has “no occasion 
. . . to quibble over the intricate application of vague treaty provisions 
and amorphous customary principles” and would only look to “the text 
of relevant statutes and controlling domestic caselaw.”78 The D.C. Cir-
cuit is the sole avenue for habeas review for Guantanamo detainees.79 
Therefore, the Circuit Court’s interpretation of international law as 
inapplicable and lacking authority controls not only the lower court but 
consequently all future petition review, unless the issue appears before 
the Supreme Court.80 
C. The Aftermath of Al-Bihani II 
1. Subsequent Habeas Cases 
 The Al-Bihani v. Obama court’s rejection of the principles of inter-
national war as an authoritative, extra-textual limitation on the authority 
of the war powers of the President, or on the powers of the U.S. courts, 
has been addressed only once since the decision was issued in January 
2010.81  In response to other habeas petitioners’ argument that they had 
a cause of action under international law, the district court simply noted 
in a footnote that the D.C. Circuit “has rejected the argument that in-
ternational law is precedential or binding on the courts,” declining to 
address the substance of the issue.82 
                                                                                                                      
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 883 (Williams, J., concurring); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. 
76 Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 871. 
77 See id. at 871–72. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 881–82 (Brown, J., concurring) (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795–96). 
80 See id. 
81 See id. at 871; Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp.2d 103, 115 n.8 (D.D.C. 2010). 
82 See Al-Zahrani, 684 F. Supp.2d at 115 n.8. 
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2. Can Domestic and International Law Coexist? 
 Judge Williams first pointed out that the Court of Appeals decision 
was difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hamdi, 
but certain scholars, perhaps following his lead, have also taken no-
tice.83 Although international law currently has no controlling author-
ity, especially within the D.C. Circuit, courts have not rejected it as an 
interpretive tool.84 Additionally, in 2008 President Obama pledged to 
review all detainee laws and policies, yet the D.C. Circuit still controls 
those laws and policies, which are akin to those in force during the 
Bush administration.85 While a common law on habeas may have de-
veloped, this common law does not provide clear guidance as to deten-
tion authority or the process due.86 In fact, the Supreme Court seems to 
have avoided creating such guidelines.87 Without any guidelines, and 
no longer required to observe the requirements of international law, is 
the United States violating international laws on human rights?88 Can 
the country expect others to abide by international rules that our court 
has deemed “inapposite” and “amorphous” with regard to the deten-
tion of American citizens captured abroad during hostilities?89 
III. Analysis 
 Affirming the rejection of Al-Bihani’s habeas petition, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit declared that international law is 
neither an extra-statutory limitation on the President’s war powers un-
der the AUMF, nor a source of authority for the U.S. judiciary.90 On 
appeal, Al-Bihani advanced four arguments, each premised on a long-
standing principle of the international laws of war, to support the con-
tention that his detention at Guantanamo violated those principles.91 In 
addition to finding his detention authorized under the AUMF and 
                                                                                                                      
83 See Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 883 (Williams, J., concurring); Gregory S. McNeal, Inter-
national Law and United States Policy Issues Arising from the United States’ Conflict with al Qaeda, 
32 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 505, 505 (2010); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. 
84 Cf. McNeal, supra note 83, at 509–11 (evaluating detention procedures under U.S. 
and international law). 
85 See John B. Bellinger, III, Terrorism and Changes to the Laws of War, 20 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int’l L. 331, 331–32 (2010); see also Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 881–82 (Brown, J., concur-
ring) (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795–96). 
86 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798; Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 871. 
87 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792, 798. 
88 See Bellinger, supra note 85, at 336. 
89 See id. at 336–37; see also Al-Bihani II, 590 F.3d at 871. 
90 See Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani II ), 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
91 See id. at 870–71. 
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2009 MCA, the court rejected international law as not only a limit on 
executive power and judicial interpretive authority, but also as a source 
of reasoning when assessing the legality of an individual’s detention.92 
 The D.C. Circuit’s unilateral rejection of international laws of war 
as even a source of interpretive guidance is incorrect and unwise.93 
Federal judicial authority extends not only to all federal laws, but also 
to all treaties—such as the Third Geneva Convention—which arise un-
der the authority of the Constitution.94 The Supreme Court frequently 
evaluates international laws of war such as the Third Geneva Conven-
tion in determining the legality of a detention or the sufficiency of de-
tention review procedures under the relevant statutes.95 Moreover, the 
2009 MCA, which amended the 2006 MCA, reflected modifications 
consistent with congressional intent to integrate the Third Geneva 
Convention and its prisoner-of-war categorization scheme into statutory 
authorization for the trial of detainees.96 The court should use the Ge-
neva Convention as guidance to develop a comprehensive standard for 
classification of detainees and the process due for detention review, as 
the standards promulgated have been ratified by the United States and 
can offer direction in an area in which the Supreme Court has not yet 
provided guidance.97 
A. The Third Geneva Convention and “Prisoners of War” 
 The Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War was signed by the President of the United States on July 
14, 1955, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and sets forth the 
obligations of signatories to one another during declared war or armed 
conflict.98 In Article 4, the Treaty identifies eight categories of individu-
als eligible for classification of prisoners of war.99 Article 5 requires that 
                                                                                                                      
92 See id. at 872–73. 
93 See id. at 883 (Williams, J., concurring). 
94 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”). 
95 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520–21 (2004); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557, 628–35 (2006) (determining petitioner’s status under the Third Geneva 
Convention in order to evaluate the suitability of the procedure afforded to him). 
96 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a (West 2010). Compare 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006) (definitions of “un-
lawful enemy combatant” and “lawful enemy combatant” absent any reference to the Third 
Geneva Convention). 
97 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008); see also Third Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 27. 
98 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 27. 
99 See id. art. 4. 
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persons that cannot be classified as prisoners of war according to Arti-
cle 4 be afforded the protection of the Treaty until a competent tribu-
nal determines their status.100 The remainder of the Treaty lays out 
comprehensive guidelines for the treatment of prisoners of war, cover-
ing everything from general protection to religious, intellectual, and 
physical activities, penal and disciplinary sanctions, and release and re-
patriation at the close of hostilities.101 Thus, the Convention’s existing 
framework could serve as a procedural model for detainee status de-
termination, whether the detainee is classified as a prisoner of war un-
der Article 4 or not, or at least provide a base from which the courts 
could upwardly depart when analyzing the statutory authorization for 
such detention and detention review.102 
B. The 2009 MCA: the Love-Hate Relationship with the  
Third Geneva Convention 
 The 2009 MCA amendments to the 2006 MCA incorporated Arti-
cle 4’s P.O.W. classification categories.103 The 2009 MCA removed the 
term “lawful enemy combatant,” which was defined in the 2006 MCA as 
a person who was: 
 (A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged 
in hostilities against the United States; 
 (B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized re-
sistance movement belonging to a State or party engaged in 
such hostilities, which are under responsible command . . . ; 
or 
 (C) a member of a regular armed force who professes alle-
giance to a government engaged in such hostilities, but not 
recognized by the United States.104 
The 2009 MCA replaces “lawful enemy combatant” with “privileged bel-
ligerent,” defined as “an individual belonging to one of the eight cate-
gories enumerated in Article 4.”105 Consequently, “unlawful enemy 
combatant” became “unprivileged enemy belligerent,” which encom-
passes individuals who were part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged 
offense, but not necessarily individuals who were members of the Tali-
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. art. 5. 
101 See id. arts. 12–16, 34–42, 118–119. 
102 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 27. 
103 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a. 
104 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a(6); 10 U.S.C. § 948a(2). 
105 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a(6); 10 U.S.C. § 948a(2). 
108 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review Vol. 34: E. Supp. 
ban, unless they were also engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners.106 Members of the Taliban—the former 
government of Afghanistan and thus a “High Contracting Party” under 
the Third Geneva Convention—captured and detained during the con-
flict with the Taliban (prior to the establishment of the new democratic 
regime) would likely have been “prisoners of war” and subject to the 
Convention.107 The amendment’s distinction therefore brings the law 
into compliance with the Convention, and the explicit reference to the 
Convention implies both the validity and usefulness of its guidance for 
statutory interpretation.108 
 Section 948b(e)’s prohibition on an unprivileged enemy belliger-
ent invoking a private right of action under the Convention conflicts 
with the Convention itself.109 However, a habeas petition challenging 
detention under the 2009 MCA at least ensures that a competent tribu-
nal—such as the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia— re-
views the detainee’s determination as an unprivileged enemy belligerent 
and, if necessary, classifies him or her as a privileged belligerent, and 
thus as a prisoner of war able to invoke the Convention.110 Additionally, 
this conflict does not prohibit courts from using international laws of 
war such as the Convention as interpretive tools when evaluating the 
legality of detentions pursuant to the 2009 MCA, or even the AUMF.111 
Conclusion 
 The complete rejection by the Court of Appeals of the interna-
tional laws of war, particularly the Third Geneva Convention, was un-
necessary. Although international law is not binding unless Congress 
implements it, under the Constitution, the Court’s authority extends to 
treaties. Additionally, the Supreme Court has made a practice of look-
ing to international law as guidance for interpretation, specifically in 
habeas petition cases. The recent amendments to the 2006 MCA also 
                                                                                                                      
106 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a(7). 
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show that Congress relied on the Third Geneva Convention, as it in-
corporated the Convention almost entirely into the revised statute. Al-
though the 2009 MCA denies appeal via the Convention to prisoners 
classified as “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” thus violating the Trea-
ty, it does not prohibit courts from relying on the Treaty for guidance 
when evaluating the legality of a detention or the process afforded. Al-
lowing international laws of war to serve as an interpretive tool could 
provide a basis from which a clearer standard of habeas petition review 
could develop. 
